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Abstract 
This article focuses on the trading trajectory of an Uzbek family of merchants from 
Tajikistan. This family runs businesses in both Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, and 
China’s famous international trading city: Yiwu. The analysis is centred on the 
accounts placed by Tajikistan’s Uzbek merchants about their historically sustained 
experience, often across several generations, in trading activities. These merchants’ 
claims of belonging to a ‘historical’ trading community rather than being ‘newcomers’ 
to long-distance commerce are articulated in relation to notions of ‘hierarchies of trade’ 
as they evolve in a twofold relational model linking Yiwu’s Changchun neighbourhood 
and Dushanbe. I suggest that the forms of conviviality enacted in Yiwu’s Changchun 
neighbourhood need to be understood in terms of the historical, multinational and 
transregional contacts that have occurred within the spaces of the former Soviet 
Union, as well as along the China-Russia and China-Central Asian borders. Equally, 
the hierarchies of trade of Uzbek merchants from Tajikistan in Yiwu’s Changchun 
neighbourhood cut-across markers of identity that juxtapose the roles of Tajik and 
Uzbek communities in Tajikistan’s contemporary politics and economics. 
Keywords: trade, hierarchies of trade, merchants, Yiwu, reputation, debt, Uzbek 
traders, Tajikistan 
Introduction: At the dinner table 
On leaving the main entrance of the 1st District of Yiwu’s Futian Market and crossing 
Chouzhou Street using the underpass that is fitted with escalators, the neighbourhood 
immediately encountered is known as Changchun. Changchun’s eateries, hotels, and 
cargo companies mostly display signboards in Cyrillic that bear names such as 
“Tashkent”, “Tiflis”, “Baku”, “Somon”, and “Chaikhana”, and show maps with the routes 
used to deliver cargo to the Caucasus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the 
Central Asian republics. In an Uzbek restaurant located in this area of Yiwu, and over 
a bowl of mutton soup, Bahrom, a trader in his late 30s explains to me that he 
considers himself a ‘successful’ trader (muafiq; [he also clarifies in Russian 
uspeshnyi).1 Such success, Bahrom continues, is the result of his family’s involvement 
in long-distance trade throughout generations.   
Bahrom, a trader from Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe and who defines himself as 
Uzbek, has invited me to join him and his companions for dinner as I greeted them 
from the street while walking to the hotel ‘Moscow’, also located in Changchun. By that 
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stage of my research (August 2016) I had known Bahrom for nearly six months, and 
often spent time with him and his father, Aka Akmal, as well as his visiting mother and 
other acquaintances in this area of Yiwu – a city in China’s Zhejiang Province with 
about 2 million inhabitants of which, approximately, 14,000 are foreigners (cf. 
Introduction in this issue; Jacobs 2016; Marsden 2017).2 I sit with Bahrom and his 
companions, including on this occasion his longstanding Uyghur friend visiting Yiwu 
from Urumqi along with his fiancé, and two Russian-speaking Han-Chinese friends 
who work as translators and commercial agents in Yiwu. In a conversation combining 
languages that are intelligible to us as a group of diners (Russian, Tajik, Uzbek, Uyghur 
and Mandarin), Bahrom continues to illustrate why he considers his family-business 
to be profitable and rewarding, even if, he clarifies, they also experienced ‘bad’ times.3 
Bahrom describes himself as one of the Central Asian traders who pioneered the 
region’s commercial activities to Yiwu in the 2000s. He did this after having traded for 
several years between China and Tajikistan using the city of Urumqi in Xinjiang as a 
central node. Yet Urumqi, Bahrom boasts, is ‘so close’ to Tajikistan that ‘everybody’, 
including his ‘grandmother’, can ‘easily’ go from Dushanbe and buy goods. In contrast, 
Bahrom continues, Yiwu, two hours by train from Shanghai, is a city for more 
established merchants like him who have considerable experience, enough capital, 
and good knowledge of long-distance trade. Bahrom and other traders of similar 
background in Yiwu usually put an emphasis on their historical genealogies of 
merchants that have had an impact in their family business, and that precede their 
shuttle-trade enterprises in the 1990s.4 They share their family histories as well as 
their travel and commerce-related experiences during the everyday forms of sociality 
fostered in offices, cafes and restaurants in Yiwu’s Changchun neighbourhood.  
By stressing his experience in commerce that day, Bahrom is challenging the jokes 
that his Chinese companions and Uyghur friend have been cracking about him 
concerning a factory that supplied Bahrom bijouterie of a lower quality than the items 
for which he had paid. Although such stories of deceit orchestrated by Chinese 
suppliers are common in Yiwu and told by traders of all nationalities, the jokes in this 
specific context parallel the depictions that Russian-speaking Chinese, Uyghur and 
even Central Asian themselves often make about the unexperienced (neopytnyi) and 
stupid/naive (tupoi) nature of Central Asian and Russian traders, especially when 
compared to ‘cunning’ (khitryi) ‘Arab’ (alabo) traders who are recognised by many in 
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Yiwu as some of the most skilful trading groups in the city and beyond.5 Indeed, 
Bahrom later on tells me, when compared to other prosperous traders in Yiwu, Central 
Asian merchants like him usually end up resembling the ‘pitiful’ (bechora) chelnoki or 
small-scale traders who carry their merchandise in suitcases. Chelnoki (shuttle 
[trader]) is a character from which Bahrom and traders of similar background who had 
established trading companies in Yiwu attempt to distance themselves. Paradoxically, 
these traders also recognise the extent to which such type of smaller scale trade in 
the 1990s was implicated in the effective up-scaling of their commercial activities from 
Urumqi to Yiwu.6  
During my encounters with Bahrom, his father, as well as other Tajik and Uzbek 
traders in Yiwu, several questions puzzled me: If numerous Central Asian traders 
began their careers in the 1990s with the boom of the shuttle-trade from Istanbul or 
Urumqi, why do Bahrom and other Uzbek traders from Tajikistan make claims about 
the long history of their trading activities? How do their previous commercial 
experiences in the Soviet era, and as traders in the 1990s play in their work and lives 
today, and in their self-perception as Uzbeks from Tajikistan? What type of 
phenomenon affords the possibilities of gathering together on a regular basis Russian-
speaking Chinese and Uyghur traders, Uzbek and Tajik merchants and other people 
of similar backgrounds who work in Yiwu and are able to communicate in common 
languages? In other words, how are we to comprehend the particular arrangements 
of traders, intelligible languages, trans-regional legacies and diverse forms of shared 
sociality including stereotyping and mockery in Yiwu’s Changchun neighbourhood? By 
focusing on Bahrom and his family’s trading trajectory, I aim to respond to these 
questions by taking seriously Tajikistan’s Uzbek merchants’ assertions of belonging to 
a historical trading community rather than being ‘newcomers’ (nawomada) to long-
distance trade. I will analyse these merchants’ claims in connection with the concept 
of ‘hierarchies of trade’ in two present-day contexts: Yiwu’s Changchun 
neighbourhood, and Tajikistan, more particularly Dushanbe. 
Hierarchies of trade refer to stratified angles and avenues that fashion traders’ 
reputation, fame, wealth and location as they become articulated in specific contexts, 
and that turn out to be especially evident when traders compare their life and work to 
that of traders of different and/or their own national, ethnic and religious background 
with whom they interact (cf. Aslanian 2011; Greif 1989; Rabo 2005). The examination 
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of the trading trajectories of merchants from Central Asia and their related historical 
linkages reflected in everyday sociality in Changchun put into question the extent to 
which we should see the 1990s as a central temporal frontier to all forms of trade 
involving actors of the former USSR (cf. introduction, Ibañez Tirado 2015a, Skvirskaja 
in this issue). As well, there is a need for further considerations of the ways in which 
the experiences of trade during the USSR (ranging from those being categorised as 
semi-legal forms of commerce to others that involved smuggling) continue to bleed 
into forms of commerce important in the region today. The trading trajectories and 
genealogies of merchants such as Bahrom constitute part of these merchants’ 
hierarchies of trade as articulated in Dushanbe and Yiwu, more particularly, in 
Changchun.  
I suggest that the forms of conviviality enacted in Yiwu’s Changchun neighbourhood 
are a reflection of the historical processes of endurance, disconnection and 
reconnection along the China-Russia-Central Asia zones of contact as now occurring 
in distinctive commercial hubs such as Yiwu; thus, everyday sociality in Changchun 
needs to be understood in terms of the multinational and transregional interactions 
that have occurred within the spaces of the former Soviet Union, and  along the China-
Russia and China-Central Asian borders. I also argue for a twofold relational model 
linking Yiwu and Dushanbe regarding hierarchies of trade. Not only in Yiwu’s 
Changchun neighbourhood but also in Dushanbe, Bahrom’s family’s  hierarchies of 
trade cut-across markers of identity that juxtapose the roles of Tajik and Uzbek 
communities in Tajikistan’s contemporary politics and economics. Therefore, the 
hierarchies of trade of Uzbek merchants from Tajikistan in Yiwu’s Changchun 
neighbourhood must be explicated in relationship to the context of contemporary 
political and economic affairs in Tajikistan. Against this background, Uzbek traders 
such as Bahrom express their inability to upgrade their commercial activities to more 
profitable sectors in Tajikistan as a form of marginalisation due to their Uzbek identity. 
Equally, the hierarchies of trade articulated in Dushanbe by these Uzbek merchants 
cannot be disentangled from their hierarchies of trade as played out in Yiwu, more 
specifically during the everyday sociality that bring together a diverse range of 
Russian-speaking traders and agents in Changchun.  
Background: Tajikistan’s Uzbek population and their commercial activities   
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Uzbeks constitute approximately 15.3 % of Tajikistan’s population (Fumigalli 2007), 
and the traders which whom I spoke cite language as the principal marker of their 
Uzbek identity. Although they are proficient in Tajik, Uzbek and Russian, they consider 
Uzbek their mother tongue and the preferred language to communicate in domestic 
spaces and amongst relatives, friends and associates who also speak Uzbek (cf. Finke 
2014; Liu 2012). As it will be clearer throughout this article, the distinctiveness of what 
constitute Uzbek identity in Tajikistan is historically contingent and, on the level of 
everyday experience, is revealed as an unfixed category (cf. Hierman 2015). In terms 
of their economic activities in Tajikistan, Uzbek traders do not form a single trading 
group but, rather, constitute poly-stranded networks that are active in different niches 
of the country’s economy (cf. Marsden 2016a). Uzbek traders I met in the northern city 
of Khujand, for example, import merchandise from Yiwu to northern Tajikistan via 
Uzbekistan using rail freight transport. With the goods stored in Khujand (usually in 
Atush and Somon bazaar), these merchants then conduct trans-border trade with 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and also Russia in legal and semi-legal ways.  
In Dushanbe, Uzbeks are popularly known by the city’s dwellers for their key role in 
the city’s restaurant sector, as well as in a range of new enterprises that involve, for 
example, the opening in the capital city of modernised supermarkets, wedding venues 
and indoor centres for children’s leisure. Numerous Uzbek traders such as Bahrom 
usually own well-established whole-sale shops and warehouses in markets and 
bazaars (e.g. Kurbon, Sakhavod and Sulton Kabir bazaars in Dushanbe). Bahrom’s 
family business mainly revolves around their running of wholesale shops and 
warehouses in different bazaars in Dushanbe and their trading company in Yiwu. They 
usually send their merchandise from Yiwu to Tajikistan by lorry via the Pamir highway 
and with the provision of a cargo company owned by Tajik traders from Dushanbe.7   
The articulation of hierarchies of trade by Uzbek merchants from Tajikistan in Yiwu’s 
Changchun neighbourhood and Dushanbe are positioned in relation to contemporary 
Tajikistan’s politics especially concerning old and new processes of state-building and 
Tajik nationalism. At times, these processes are expressed in allegations of 
Tajik/Uzbek rivalry and other forms of internal regionalism that date from the formation 
of the Soviet republics onwards. The period between the Russian conquest of Central 
Asia’s emirates and khanates and the formation of the USSR is the time at which the 
Tajik nation started to emerge through what Kassymbekova refers to as different 
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‘tactics of governance’ (2016:2). These included the fashioning of new territorial 
boundaries, the resettlement of ‘Tajik’ people, and the ubiquitous promotion of ‘Tajik’ 
language, literature and folklore (cf. Abashin 2004, Reeves 2014). Even if in the late 
1950s some Soviet scholars had problems differentiating Uzbeks and Tajiks through 
processes of self-reference (Bergne 2007, Hirsch 2005), Horák documents (2010:72) 
how politicised academic discussions about the delimitations of Uzbek and Tajik 
identity involved intellectuals condemning those who supported pan-Turkism and later 
pan-Uzbekism as ‘Tajik traitors’ and ‘Uzbekified Tajiks’: they were accused of working 
in opposition to Tajikistan’s territorial integrity after the 1920s. The ideological 
deprecation of Uzbek markers of identity in Tajikistan has been exacerbated in the 
post-independent era, as nationalist discourses are also informed by the regularly 
tense geopolitical relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over various themes 
that include the allocation of water and the Roghun Dam project (Ibañez Tirado 
2015b), the historical sources of Tajikistan’s territory, culture and statehood (Ilkhamov 
2004; Horák 2010; Kamoliddin 2006;), and the ownership of the historical cities of 
Bukhara and Samarkand. 
It is not the purpose of this article to theorise Uzbek identity/ethnicity. Rather, this 
article adds to this body of scholarship by examining how ideological debates are 
reflected in the sociality among traders of Tajik and Uzbek background in China and 
Tajikistan. In Dushanbe, in a context where a clear-cut Tajik identity is constantly 
signalled by the exclusive promotion of Tajik history, ‘race’ and language fostered by 
government institutions, experienced Uzbek traders such as Bahrom perceive 
themselves as being incapable of keeping the growth of their commercial activities 
because of their underprivileged position as Tajikistan’s citizens of Uzbek background. 
Bahrom’s explanations on the lines of marginalisation, however, are not fully 
accountable for Bahrom’s and his family’s commercial stagnation in Dushanbe. Such 
explanations are also related to the ways in which hierarchies of trade are played out 
in Yiwu’s Chagnchun neighbourhood. Before analysing aspects of everyday sociality 
in Changchun, I now provide a summary of Bahrom’s family’s history as narrated to 
me by Bahrom himself and his father, Aka Akmal. 
Trading genealogies: the case of Bahrom’s family  
7 
 
 
Bahrom’s trading genealogy started with Aka Akmal’s deceased father, whom they 
said, had already learned to trade from his father before the Soviet period in the 
Ferghana Valley in the beginning of the 20th century - although they did not have 
details about what their commercial activities had involved. Their merchant lineage 
moved in the present to Bahrom as the most skilful of Aka Akmal’s offspring, yet also 
included Bahrom’s brothers, his two sisters (in their early twenties) and his mother who 
also owned a shop and thus visited Yiwu and Guangzhou twice a year.  Bahrom and 
Aka Akmal usually placed a strong emphasis on the role of their family as an entity 
whose members cooperated with one another, that had learned about commerce 
throughout generations, and that suffered the perils of long-distance trade and enjoyed 
its benefits together – even if conflict and misunderstandings over money and products 
were common. 
Bahrom’s paternal grandparents arrived in Tajikistan in the 1950s from Margilan, a 
town located in the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. Bahrom’s grandfather studied 
agronomy in Tashkent, and, after graduating, was relocated to Dushanbe where he 
worked in a series of water and agricultural projects, including several schemes for 
developing flower cultivation (especially roses and chrysanthemums). Aka Akmal, told 
me that although his family had not experienced economic problems, his father began 
to complement the family income with the sale of flowers grown in his garden. He used 
to take one or two boxes of flowers to Moscow where they commanded a good price: 
“By the time my father began his work-related trips (komandirovka) to Moscow we 
were experts in growing and keeping flowers fresh.”  
During the Soviet period Aka Akmal became a lorry-driver and drove between 
Tajikistan and Russia a kamaz (a type of Soviet-manufactured lorry) loaded with fresh 
and canned fruit and vegetables. A few years later, and with the help of his father, he 
became involved in the authorised transport (mainly by air) of flowers from Tajikistan 
to Moscow. In the early 1980s, by which point Bahrom was already 4 or 5 years old, 
Aka Akmal began to travel to New Delhi and Bangladesh to acquire flowers in 
authorised procurement journeys; he later traded some of these flowers in Soviet 
Russia in semi-legal ways (c.f. Lajipathi Rai 1991).8 During these trips, he became 
acquainted with Indian merchants who were interested in buying gold: Aka Akmal not 
only bought flowers in South Asia, but also started to sell gold jewellery that he 
personally had acquired from families in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In those years 
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Bahrom, the eldest of Aka Akmal’s six children, also started to trade flowers and 
textiles brought from Indian by his father firstly in his neighbourhood and sometime 
later in central Dushanbe.  
Both Aka Akmal and Bahrom remembered that during Tajikistan’s civil war (1992-
1998) life in Dushanbe was hard not just because of the violence but also as a result 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic crisis. Aka Akmal 
stopped traveling to Russia, India and Bangladesh, but started to drive to Regar, a 
small town close to the Tajik-Uzbek border. He became involved in purchasing 
‘everything’ (harchis – e.g. goods of everyday use) in the border town and in the 
transport of these to Dushanbe – a journey that, as he recalled to me, meant he 
needed to interact with military and police check-points, bandits, and bullets flying in 
all directions. Bahrom, by then in his early teens, started to sell cigarettes that he 
procured from Afghan traders working in Dushanbe; by the end of the Tajik civil war 
(when roads were safer to travel along), he accompanied his father to Regar to buy 
smuggled petrol to Tajikistan from Uzbekistan. Aka Akmal transported the petrol in 
larger quantities to buyers in Dushanbe and beyond; at the same time, along with two 
of his friends (jura), he also became involved in the business of scrap metal 
(metalicheskii lom) and copper (med’). He explained to me:  
“There were broken cars and old pipes and cables dumped here and there. I 
transported some of this stuff to my yard. I think it was 1994 or so, an Uzbek friend of 
mine who had worked in East Germany came with a German friend to Dushanbe. This 
man was interested in scrap metal especially copper. He had a company there. We 
became business partners”. 
The business of scrap metal and copper had been so profitable for Bahrom’s family 
that having only pursued this line of business for three or four years they generated 
enough profit to last for six years. They bought land to build a grand family house, land 
for each of Aka Akmal’s children, shops in the newly opened Sakhovad bazaar and 
land for a holiday house in the outskirts of Dushanbe. At the same time, Aka Akmal 
travelled to Urumqi for the first time in 1997, initially to procure batteries and small 
electronics, and, after some years, also mobile phones. In 2000 Bahrom travelled with 
his father to Urumqi to buy jewellery and cosmetics, a trade that he had himself 
launched. The year after, Bahrom’s mother, who had previously managed the family’s 
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shops in Dushanbe, also began to travel to Urumqi thereby becoming active in 
selecting new and fashionable designs for their products. In 2006, Bahrom made 
friends with a wealthy Uyghur man from Urumqi who was starting a building company 
in Xinjiang, but whose wife was living in Yiwu. He invited Bahrom to travel to Yiwu with 
him. Bahrom remembers: 
“I call my father and tell him ‘I am flying to Yiwu.’ He tells me ‘you don’t have my 
permission’. He had never been there himself and did not know my new Uyghur friend. 
He was afraid that something bad could happen to me. In those times, we used to 
carry lots of cash. We have a fight over the phone. I travel to Yiwu and call him from 
there again. He is very angry about my disobedience. I tell him “Father! You don’t 
know how many things are sold here and at what prices!’ He hangs up the phone. I 
return to Dushanbe one week later, and when our goods arrive he is astonished. I 
bought so many beautiful things that we had never seen in Urumqi, and that customers 
had not seen in Dushanbe. We made a huge profit then.” 
Bahrom and his father travelled to Yiwu twice a year between 2006 and 2012. In 2013 
Bahrom finally decided to open his own trading company in Yiwu and to live most of 
the time in China. Bahrom was married in Dushanbe and he and his wife had two 
children, yet he wanted to expand his family business by supplying his and his family’s 
shops, and by working as an agent for the ‘inexperienced’ ‘newcomers’ from Tajikistan 
who had begun to travel from Urumqi to Yiwu. Bahrom’s clients usually stayed in Yiwu 
one or two weeks, placed orders and went back to Dushanbe to wait for the delivery 
which usually took between 40 to 60 days. Bahrom’s company helped them to find 
suppliers in Yiwu (usually in Futian market), inspected the merchandise once delivered 
by suppliers, arranged the documents required for exporting, and placed the goods in 
a cargo company. Using the name of his company, at times Bahrom also obtained for 
his clients goods on credit in Futian.  
By narrating their family’s trading trajectory, Bahrom and Aka Akmal emphasised the 
skills and knowledge they had learnt from one another and from Bahrom’s grandfather. 
Besides, the knowledge and experience related to short and long-distance commerce 
throughout generations were the principal markers of the hierarchies of trade that 
Bahrom’s family employed to build a reputation for themselves in Yiwu. As a family of 
Uzbek traders, they have learnt how to work with different lines of products and in 
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diverse and often changing political contexts within Tajikistan and abroad; they also 
highlighted the ways in which they had not only survived, but also thrived in times of 
war. In the sixteen years that Bahrom had travelled between China and Tajikistan, he 
had achieved a good command of Chinese and Uyghur language, in addition to 
Russian and Tajik which he spoke fluently since his childhood. These skills and 
experiences, he said, allowed him to foster a good reputation in Yiwu and to attract 
new clientele. Building a good reputation involved efforts usually made in the 
convoluted sociality among traders, agents and clients in Yiwu’s Changchun 
neighbourhood. 
Hierarchies of trade in Yiwu’s Changchun neighbourhood 
In Yiwu hierarchies of trade, or the multifaceted avenues that traders articulate in 
relation to one another to build or maintain a reputable name, are usually expressed 
in terms of the traders’ wealth and character, time of arrival to China and country of 
origin (Anderson in this issue; Belguidoum and Pliez 2015; Marsden 2016b; Skvirskaja 
in this issue). The foreign merchants who arrived earlier to China in the 1990s, and 
have established trading companies there might be in a better position than those who 
began to trade in more recent times; and those traders who run big companies with 
enough liquidity and clean credit-history are perceived as being more trustworthy than 
those traders who run companies based on the brokerage of credit from Chinese 
suppliers (cf. Anderson in this issue). At times, traders measure the size and reputation 
of their companies regarding the number of containers they export: whilst Bahrom’s 
small company shipped half or one container every four/six weeks to Tajikistan, other 
companies ran by Afghans or Palestinians, for example, are able to ship an average 
of 30 containers per month. Hence, traders of recognised historical networks such as 
those of Arab, Indian and Afghan background in Yiwu are spoken about as being more 
reliable, skilful and thus prosperous than minor traders such as those of Russian or 
Central Asian background. Finally, hierarchies of trade are also expressed by, and 
discussed among traders on a day-to-day basis in Yiwu in relationship to the cars, 
offices, furniture and clothing they have and display, as well as their overall conduct in 
both the market-place and the spaces of leisure such as restaurants, cafes and 
nightclubs.  
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Foreign merchants in Yiwu aim to build or maintain a respectable position in the 
hierarchies of trade for different reasons which include attracting new clientele, 
business associates and even intimate companions; obtaining goods on credit, better 
prices or speed deliveries from Chinese suppliers, and modelling themselves as 
specific types of persons throughout their trading careers. The last aspect might 
include shaping oneself as a pious, cosmopolitan, modern, patriotic or morally-
informed subject in relationship to specific understandings of religion, gender and age 
that vary according to the trader’s place of origin, life-trajectory and particular 
aspirations. In Bahrom’s and his family’s case, their claims to their historical 
participation in trade are one of the multiple ways in which hierarchies of trade are 
articulated; as Rabo (2005) has shown for traders in Aleppo, claims to a reputable 
genealogy in commerce is part of how traders’ build up a name. In Yiwu’s Changchun 
neighbourhood, Bahrom and other Uzbek traders from Tajikistan emphasise their 
historic role as merchants in order to show to others that they are not inexpert or new 
to commerce – as Russians and Central Asians are depicted by themselves and 
others as being. A day in Changchun involves the following vignettes.  
Bahrom’s office in Yiwu is located under a signboard in Cyrillic announcing the routes 
of a cargo company from Yiwu to Tashkent, Osh and beyond. There is also a map of 
Russia, Central Asia and China painted on the wall that, together with the numerous 
motorbikes that are parked in the vicinity, serves as an urban landscape for foreign 
and local traders in their way to Yiwu’s Futian market. An Uyghur shop whose owner 
greets clients in Russian and Uzbek sits next to a Russian bakery whose owners 
arrived eight years ago to Yiwu from Vladivostok; and a Russian-speaking Han-
Chinese who grew up in Khabarovsk in the late 1990s and works as a translator and 
agent in Yiwu has a casual chat with Sonya, a Russian woman from Vladivostok who 
recently opened a cargo company in the city and who says that she felt attracted to 
business because her grand-grandfather(who was married to a Chinese woman) 
traded in China in the early 20th century. In the evenings, Sonya closes her office and 
greets Bahrom and his father with her hand, but does not usually spend time with 
these men. Bahrom and his father gather with their friends (mainly other Uzbek, Tajik 
and Uyghur male traders and restauranteurs) to drink tea, smoke cigarettes and play 
takht - a board game similar to backgammon – nearby Sonya’s office. Sonya refers to 
Bahrom and his father as ‘respectful’ traders, but she also clarifies that she prefers to 
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rent a flat in a ‘good’ area of Yiwu far from Changchun: Sonya finds this neighbourhood 
intimidating and dangerous at night when, she says, drunken Chinese men, wealthy 
Azeri macho-bravado with expensive cars and motorbikes, and ‘unmannered’ 
(nevospitannye) Central Asians harass Russian women like her, making rude and 
inappropriate remarks in the streets.  
Not far from Sonya’s office, in a nearby Armenian cafeteria, Larisa, a Russian waitress 
from eastern Ukraine, explains to me that her former employer, a Tajik man who 
owned a restaurant on the other side of the road, was abusive and harassed her. 
Larisa feels safer in her current job with ‘cultured’ Armenian traders who frequent this 
locale and who also speak Russian. The Tajik man who allegedly mistreated Larisa is 
also associated with a cargo company, jointly owned by a Russian-speaking Chinese 
man and his Russian partner: the company provides service to Russia, Ukraine and 
the Caucasus and gives the Tajik restauranteur a small commission for sending new 
clients. The Tajik restaurateur thus tells me that Larisa lies about his rude behaviour 
because the truth is that she attempted to ‘steal’ his Russian clients (mainly new 
traders on their first trip to Yiwu) and direct those to her husband’s recently opened 
cargo-company. According to this Tajik and his Russian-speaking Han-Chinese friend, 
this new Ukrainian cargo-company is unsuccessful and unreliable – otherwise, they 
ask, why does Larisa need to work as a waitress? The Tajik and Chinese men 
conclude that, after all, Ukrainians are ‘stupid’ (tupye) in matters related to business. 
Another day Bahrom tells me that he does not know who to believe in this story – as 
gossip has spread out in Changchun about the unscrupulous behaviour of the Tajik 
restauranteur. The important issue for Bahrom, he says, is that unfortunately the 
restauranteur ends up giving a bad name to other traders from Tajikistan. This has 
implications for the reputation of small companies such as Bahrom’s, as he also relies 
on finding new Russian-speaking clients from beyond Tajikistan in Changchun who 
need a translator and agent to accompany them to Futian Market.  
Yiwu is a new commercial city which arose through a combination of the 
entrepreneurship spirit of its inhabitants and the policies of Zhejiang authorities in 
projecting Yiwu and its markets as the worldwide hub of small commodities (Jacobs 
2016). The stories of everyday sociality in Changchun, and the types of conviviality 
fashioned in diverse urban spaces within Yiwu demonstrate that the potentials of 
people to cluster and associate to one another are only partially inflected by the more 
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recent history of Yiwu and the local government’s efforts in shaping the city as highly 
attractive to foreign traders (Rui in this issue). In the context of China’s grand initiatives 
such as the New Silk Road, the Eurasian Bridge and the Belt and Road, scholars have 
discussed how diverse populations and trading networks have been moving, working 
and operating along these routes (to different pace and degrees) without the alleged 
provision of such newly-flanged grand schemes (e.g. Chang 2012; Karrars 2016; 
Marsden 2017). Equally, Changchun neighbourhood responds to profounder historical 
processes that overlap these initiatives, yet also supersede them and the city. The 
merchants’ claims to reputable trajectories as ways of playing out their hierarchies of 
trade respond, to certain extent, to historical processes beyond Yiwu that had 
produced throughout centuries the possibilities of certain languages, ethnic/national 
categories and their stereotypes as being mutually intelligible and recognisable to one 
another. In this regard, Changchun reflects the multinational character of the former 
Soviet Union, as well as the historical encounters of diverse multi-ethnic populations 
that included labourers and merchants along the China-Russia-Central Asian border 
regions in the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries.9 These revived forms of sociality 
can be undoubtedly seen in the languages spoken in Changchun, as well as in the 
stereotypes of traders and related personnel from disparate nationalities every so 
often the topic of conversations over dinner after a long day of walking in Yiwu’s Futian 
market. These may include Russians deriding their Russian-speaking Chinese agents 
who frequently hail from the Heilongjiang province and grew up listening or learning 
Russian language (cf. Fedorova 2013). They are said to have incomprehensible 
accents and to be ‘dirty’ (griaznye) and untrustworthy.10 In return, these Chinese 
agents often express their scorn for Russian traders: men are portrayed as being ‘rude’ 
(grubyi) and ‘alcoholic’ (alkash), and women, although very beautiful, are said to be 
capricious (kapriznye). Besides, Russians are said to be unable to learn a word in 
Mandarin even if they had worked and purchased their merchandises in China for 
decades (cf. Fedorova 2011).  
In this context, Bahrom’s claims that Uzbek traders from Tajikistan, such as himself 
and his father, have a long pedigree in commerce constitutes an aspect of their efforts 
at shaping a good reputation for themselves in the face of recurrent accusations, often 
in joking tones, by Russian-speaking Chinese and Uyghurs that Central Asians are 
beginners. Tajikistan’s Uzbek trader usually attempt to contest other allegations in 
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Changchun about not having enough capital to conduct businesses of bigger scale 
such as exporting numerous containers every week (as Azeri trader and Uzbekistan’s 
citizens are said of being able to do); opening cargo companies in Yiwu with their own 
lorries (as Russian-speaking Han Chinese are alleged to own), or factories in China 
(as ‘Arabs’ are spoken about as establishing). They also have to navigate the negative 
stereotypes surrounding Central Asian men by Russian-speaking independent traders 
visiting the city. Some of them arrive to Yiwu in organised shopping-tours from Russian 
cities, and are familiar with Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz in their capacity of 
underprivileged labour-migrants working abroad. Bahrom’s emphasis on his family 
reputation as merchants, and the necessity of displaying an upright comportment in 
Changchun on a daily basis are vital for him to attract Russian-speaking traders as his 
clients, to obtain merchandises on credit for them from Futian, and more broadly, to 
make his company thrive in such a competitive and unforgiving environment. Attracting 
new clients and business ventures, however, implies different types of risks as now I 
analyse.  
New clients: Risk, debt and losing face in Yiwu 
In April 2017 I met Bahrom again, this time in Dushanbe. His company in Yiwu had 
shut down four months earlier, and having failed to renew his Chinese visa, he had 
been forced to go back to live in Tajikistan. His wholesale bijouterie shops in 
Dushanbe’s Kurbon bazaar were still operating successfully, and his father and mother 
were still able to obtain short-term China visas to return to Yiwu for the short trips they 
needed to make in order to supply their shops with new products. All in all, however, 
Bahrom’s company in Yiwu had brought him a considerable loss in monetary terms, 
as well as problems with clients and family, and a damaged reputation with some of 
his Chinese suppliers. Bahrom then proceeded to recall his experiences over the last 
four months. 
Bahrom’s work with the handful of clients he had established in Yiwu generated 
enough income to send money to Dushanbe, and to maintain his company that 
incurred expenses such as the rent of a small office and a flat in Changchun. At times, 
however, it was the profit in Dushanbe’s bazaars that paid for his expenses in Yiwu. 
Then, Bahrom was often questioned by his wife and parents about why he did not 
want to return to Dushanbe. It was under such family pressure that in May 2016 
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Bahrom took risks with the aim of making big profits and stop his family’s questions 
about his choice to live abroad. Bahrom met Shodijon, a Dushanbe-based trader born 
in Kulob, southern Tajikistan. Shodijon had arrived in Yiwu from Guangzhou, and was 
on his first trip to the city. Shodijon was a civil engineer working in a reputed building 
company in Tajikistan, allegedly ran by a member of the presidential family also from 
Kulob. In recent years, Shodijon oversaw the procurement of pipes and cables from 
China for a new building-project of apartment compounds in Tajikistan’s capital. The 
trips to China were paid by the company he worked for, yet, at the same time, Shodijon 
also began trading independently: in addition to procuring goods for the company, he 
bought merchandise to sell to his clients in Dushanbe’s Sulton Kabir bazaar, a market 
that specialises in construction material. Shodijon told Bahrom that one of his friends, 
a wealthy businessman, had begun working in quarries in Tajikistan and would supply 
materials for the building company he worked for: he invited Bahrom to be part of the 
business on condition that he helped him to buy in China five stone crushing machines. 
Bahrom had no previous knowledge of Shodijon, but believed in his credentials as an 
engineer, the employee of a recognised company, and a newly established 
independent trader. As he was not familiar with this type of equipment, Bahrom spent 
more than two weeks conducting research about crushing machines and visiting 
several factories. Bahrom decided on a supplier based near to Beijing who sold him 
the crushing machines at a price of US$4300 each; Bahrom then sold the machines 
to Shodijon for US$5000 each plus the expenses of transportation to Tajikistan.  
A profit of about US$3500 in a couple of weeks was worth the hazard, Bahrom 
explained to me, because working for a client buying in Futian market for a week 
usually brought him no more than US$100-200 as a commission for placing orders. 
The risks of this business, however, included Bahrom’s lack of experience in 
machinery: he could easily have been deceived in price and quality by the 
manufacturer. The second and most important risk was the fact that Bahrom had to 
pay for the machines in China and recover his money once the machines arrived in 
Dushanbe. Bahrom did not have enough money to pay for five machines, so he paid 
for three and took two on a credit agreement that required him to pay the remaining 
dues to the supplier within three months. The machines arrived in Dushanbe in the 
summer of 2016 and Shodijon took the machines away, but did not pay off his debts 
to Bahrom as agreed. Bahrom called him persistently; Bahrom’s father and brothers 
16 
 
 
put Shodijon under pressure by visiting his house and working place and directly 
requesting the money. After a couple of months during which Shodijon had promised 
to pay for the machines, he began to threaten Bahrom: Shodijon alleged that the 
machines were faulty and he would therefore not pay his debt. Finally, Shodijon went 
into hiding. At the same time, Bahrom had lost the money he invested in three 
machines and had the Chinese supplier putting pressure on him to pay the remaining 
funds in China.  
In such a desperate situation and without enough clients, Bahrom decided to close his 
office in Yiwu and return to Dushanbe to live from the profit of his whole-sale shops. If 
he wanted to return to China, he had to make enough money to pay for his debt with 
the supplier near Beijing as, apparently, he had already ‘stained’ Bahrom’s name in 
Yiwu. Because Bahrom found this supplier through the advice of Russian-speaking 
Chinese acquaintances in Yiwu, the factory’s owner spread the word amongst these 
same acquaintances that Bahrom had fled the city without paying his debts. He also 
posted Bahrom’s details via WeChat and other internet-based platforms of social 
media where Chinese suppliers and factory owners usually name and shame foreign 
traders who run away without paying their debts –apparently with the aim of preventing 
other suppliers providing old debtors with credit. In addition, Bahrom’s shops in Kurbon 
bazaar were not producing enough profit as in previous years: the exchange rate of 
the Tajik somoni in relation to the dollar was fluctuating and reducing the profit margins 
made on the sale of goods imported from China. Bahrom described his situation to me 
as being at its lowest ever.  
In this context, Bahrom and his father expressed their frustrations about being unable 
to up-grade their trading activities towards the sectors where ‘real money’ was to be 
made in Tajikistan: construction and machinery. They told me that ‘newcomers’ such 
as Shodijon and especially from Tajikistan’s Kulob region were benefiting from their 
kinship ties and alliances with the presidential family. The questions surrounding 
Shodijon’s case and Bahrom’s sense of marginalisation are evoked as being related 
to the status of Uzbeks as a minority in contemporary Tajikistan, as well as to the 
current political outline of Tajikistan’s state lead by President Rahmon and his family. 
Tajikistan’s President, in power since 1992, portrays himself and his family as Tajiks 
hailing from the country’s south (Kulob region, more specifically Danghara); this ruling 
elite have positioned their companies and enterprises in the main sectors of the 
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economy in the past two decades.11 On the one hand, Kulobi identity and government-
led ideas of the ‘purity’ of the Tajik ‘race’ have flourished as a symbol of government 
authority. On the other, negative stereotypes of Kulobis have been popularised among 
non-Kulobi population; thus Kulobis have come to be regarded as symbols of 
intimidation and the unmerited appropriation of the country’s resources, aspects of life 
in the country referred by some scholars as ‘Kulyabisation’ (cf. Marsden 2012; 
Fumigalli 2007).12   
Against this background, Bahrom and his family alleged that companies owned by 
people from Kulob were usually given the permissions to build new apartment blocks 
in the capital, and also obtained government contracts for other public projects. As 
traders of Uzbek rather than Tajik background, Bahrom and his family could not win a 
contract to supply such companies with building materials even if they demonstrably 
had the capacity, experience and connections to purchase all types of goods in China 
and beyond. They boasted that their contacts included old acquaintances in Russia 
and India, as well as their old business partners in Germany, but that there was no 
space for them in Tajikistan’s market. Finally, they concluded that Bahrom’s 
undertaking with the crushing machines had failed not because Bahrom had been 
stupid or inexperienced, but because Kulobis ‘protect one another’ and therefore, 
Shodijon had been able to hide himself whilst being protected from ‘above’.13  
My encounters with traders from the Kulob region involved in the purchase of building 
material, only partially confirmed the perceptions held by Bahrom and his family. 
These encounters further problematise simplistic notions of clear-cut differences 
between Tajik and Uzbek identities in Tajikistan. In Kulob city I spoke to a Tajik man 
who worked for a famous company that ran petrol stations in Tajikistan and that has 
direct links to the presidential family. Although he said that he did not act as an 
independent trader, but as an expert advisor on the type of goods required for this line 
of business, he usually travelled to China to procure the necessary goods and 
materials for the maintenance of the petrol pumps. Another man from the town of 
Vose’, also in Kulob region, told me that he had gained a government contract to 
supply building materials for the new stadium that was being built in Vose’ with the 
sponsorship of the regional and national government. He explained to me that the 
contract has been given to him because of his friendship with the owners of the 
company in charge of the construction project – who also happened to be related to 
18 
 
 
the presidential family. Yet, he emphasised additionally that he had a long experience 
of working in China: having commenced trading in Urumqi in the 1990s, he married a 
Uyghur woman (he divorced her 8 years later). Over more than ten years, he had been 
involved in the import of building materials purchased from Uyghur suppliers to 
Tajikistan. Although he described himself as Tajik, he told me that his mother was 
Uzbek, and that he had grown up speaking the Uzbek language in the village near 
Vose’ where he spent his childhood. Indeed, in the Kulob region there are numerous 
villages and towns well-known for their families of mixed Uzbek and Tajik background.  
These cases demonstrate that Bahrom’s claims of being unable to up-grade his 
business towards a more profitable sector is indeed related to the patron-client 
relations in which Tajikistan’s politics and economics evolve. Yet, as the last case 
elucidates, the identity of Uzbeks in Tajikistan is fluid and cannot be pinned down to 
something that is exclusive and well-bounded, and thus that can be used to one-
dimensionally explain why Bahrom and his family are unable to enter the business in 
building materials. These claims also need to be understood in terms of the articulation 
of hierarchies of trade within both Tajikistan and Yiwu: marginalisation on the grounds 
of being Uzbek were partly deployed as a way of defending Bahrom’s and his family’s 
reputation as experienced, skilful and honest traders at moments in which they were 
forced to close their company in Yiwu. Assertions of marginalisation on identity lines 
allowed them to preserve a respectable name among other traders in both Changchun 
and Dushanbe in a period when they were being described by others as having ‘lost 
face’ in China due to Bahrom’s miscalculations and his resulting unpaid debt.  
Conclusion 
In this article, I have revealed how Bahrom’s grandfather traded flowers during the 
Soviet period to Moscow; Aka Akmal’s traded flowers and gold to India and 
Bangladesh and scrap metal to Germany; Bahrom and his parents conducted shuttle-
trade activities in Urumqi before finally Bahrom was able to establish his company in 
Yiwu. These trading trajectories are embedded in the ways in which hierarchies of 
trade aim at building a respectable reputation for this evolving merchant family. Very 
importantly, these types of histories indicate that although the wave of shuttle-trade of 
the 1990s evidences the salience of new forms of commerce and mobility at the end 
of the Soviet era, ethnographic investigations on contemporary long-distance trade in 
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the post-socialist realm demand a careful consideration of the historical depth of the 
zones of contact and exchange that precede the 20th century. Given the diversity in 
the trading activities of Tajikistan’s Uzbeks, this article is unable to make 
generalisations about the trading activities of this ‘minority’ as a whole, or their 
commercial strength in Tajikistan more generally. Yet, by presenting Bahrom’s family’s 
trajectory and locating their history in the socio-economic and political context of 
Tajikistan today, I hope to stimulate further research about Central Asia’s Uzbek 
merchants, and their role in trade across the region as well as with China (e.g. Balci 
2003; Shahadeo 2011).  
The warming up of bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union from 1983, 
combined with the economic growth of China, the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
more recent initiatives such as the New Silk Road, the Eurasian Bridge and the Belt 
and Road have enabled, to an extent, the movement and interaction of peoples of 
different backgrounds from China, Central Asia and Russia – often with the purposes 
of trade. In addition to these relatively new processes, I have suggested that the forms 
of conviviality enacted in Changchun as well as the way in which traders such as 
Bahrom position themselves within Yiwu’s hierarchies of trade need to be understood 
in terms of the previous historical and multinational contacts that have occurred within 
the spaces of the former Soviet Union, as well as along the China-Russia and China-
Central Asian borders. In the context of Yiwu, I have argued that the articulation of 
hierarchies of trade in Changchun neighbourhood is shaped in everyday sociality and 
in response to the mockery uttered by Uyghurs, Russian-speaking Chinese and other 
Russian-speaking traders more broadly who, at times, depict Central Asians 
merchants as stupid, unexperienced or uneducated.  
Finally, the articulation of Bahrom’s hierarchies of trade in Tajikistan emphasises this 
family’s Uzbek background and their historical pedigree as traders in contrast to 
depictions of Tajik ‘newcomers’ - inexpert traders lacking merit who usually, although 
not always, were referred as to hailing from Tajikistan’s Kulob region and thus alleged 
to have connections and protection from the political elites who control the access to 
Tajikistan’s resources and most profitable companies. On the one hand, Shodijon, the 
man who cheated Bahrom and was thus implicated in the demise of his company in 
Yiwu, benefitted from the patronage of an unidentified figure in Tajikistan able to let 
him escape without paying off his debts. On the other hand, those company-based 
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and independent traders from the Kulob region might be able to identify themselves 
or their ancestors as Uzbek in some contexts. So, this is not a straightforward story of 
regionalism or Tajik/Uzbek rivalry. Bahrom’s assertions about being unable to up-
grade his business to the more profitable construction companies reflect Tajikistan’s 
economic and political affairs today, but his claims about the patronage of the 
‘newcomers’ were also a way in which he attempted to recuperate his reputation as a 
good trader after the great risks and miscalculations he had taken in Yiwu with the 
crushing machines. After all, Bahrom was foreseeing the continuation of his trading 
activities, and also expressed a desire of returning to live in China – possibly Yiwu. 
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1 Words in brackets are in Tajik and Russian language. Following anthropological convention I have used 
pseudonyms for all people referred to in this text. 
2 I conducted 7 months of fieldwork in Yiwu, China (2016), and one month in Tajikistan (2017). The research 
methods include participant observation, open-ended interviews, and mapping of Yiwu’s neighbourhoods and 
markets, and Dushanbe’s bazaars.   
3 Bahrom is fluent in all these languages, and we all communicate with one another in Russian. At points during 
our encounters, Bahrom switched to communicate with me in Tajik, to his Chinese friends in Mandarin, and to 
his Uyghur associates in Uyghur and Uzbek. 
4 The number of traders from Tajikistan operating in Yiwu are relatively small in comparison to other major 
trading networks in the city. In 2016, there were three well-established trading and cargo companies and two 
restaurants from Tajikistan in Yiwu. I spoke with approximately thirty male and female traders from Tajikistan in 
Yiwu both of Uzbek and Tajik background. The great majority of them were temporary visitors to Yiwu who 
stayed on business trips usually lasting little more than two weeks. 
5 People in Yiwu use the generic alabo (Arab in Mandarin) to refer to traders from the Middle East. My 
interlocutors that night mentioned that among the alabo they knew, Iraqi, Syrian and Yemeni traders are the most 
reputable and successful. 
6 For an analysis of ‘shuttle-trade’ (chelnoki) from the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of socialism see: Humphrey (1999); Özcan (2010); Piart (2013); Spector (2017). For an examination on how 
these practices became to be associated to semi-legal and shameful forms of trade see: Holzlehner (2014); 
Mukhina (2009); Niyozov and Shamatov (2006); Humphrey and Skvirskaja (2009); Humphrey and Mandel eds. 
(2002). 
7 On the Pamir Highway and related commercial routes see: Mostowlansky (2017), chapter 2. 
8 Flowers were of great importance in the Soviet Union. Giving flowers in special occasions and during festivities 
such as Women’s Day was a symbol of, and a practice aiming at shaping ‘civilized’ and loyal Soviet subjects and 
citizens. Therefore, lavish displays of flowers were also salient aspects of military parades and related 
commemorations. 
9 For an examination of the diverse populations that migrated from China to Russia and from Russia to China in 
the 19th century see Dastyshen (2012); Peshkov (2018); Holzheimer (2014). For the migration of Chinese citizens 
to Central Asia in the 20th century see Sadovskaya (2012), and for the multi-national encounters among traders in 
the China-Central Asian borders in the 20th century see: Alff (2016), Steenberg (2016), Parham (2016). 
10 For an analysis of negative stereotypes surrounding Chinese workers and merchants in Russia from the 19th 
century see Bille (2012); Holzheimer (2014); Peshkov (2018); Ryzhova (2018), Skvirskaja (this issue). 
11 For a more thorough analysis of how Tajikistan’s companies are not simply co-opted by elite networks, but also 
involve global actors such as multinational corporations and international donor agencies see Heathershaw (2011).   
12 The majority of people from Kulob do not have contacts with the ruling family and have not directly benefited 
from the current Kulobi elites within the Tajik government (see Ibañez Tirado 2015b). 
13 For a discussion on patron-client relations and patronage in Tajikistan see Ibañez Tirado (forthcoming). 
                                                          
